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Abstract 
John Earman and John T. Roberts advocate a challenging and radical claim regarding the 
semantics of laws in the special sciences: the statistical account. According to this account, 
a typical special science law “asserts a certain precisely defined statistical relation among 
well-defined variables” (Earman and Roberts 1999) and this statistical relation does not 
require being hedged by ceteris paribus conditions. In this paper, we raise two objections 
against the attempt to cash out the content of special science generalizations in statistical 
terms. 
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1. Introduction 
John Earman and John T. Roberts defend a view according to which fundamental physics 
states laws that are expressed by universal generalizations (which are not qualified by any 
ceteris paribus condition or proviso). By contrast, the special sciences do not state univer-
sal laws but rather statistical generalizations. Since this account of special science ‘laws’ 
does not have a name we call it the statistical account. According to the statistical account, 
special science generalizations are to be interpreted either as statements about actual non-
strict correlations or as statements that are ‘mostly true’. Earman and Roberts claim that 
the statistical account does not require a qualification by ceteris paribus (henceforth, cp) 
conditions. As a consequence, cp-conditions are neither needed for the fundamental laws 
(because they are strict) nor for the special science generalizations. This seems to be a pri-
ma facie advantage for the statistical account because the exact meaning of cp-conditions 
remains controversial.  
In this paper, we will leave aside Earman and Roberts’s claim about the laws of 
physics. We focus on special science generalizations and present two objections against the 
statistical account. 
 
2. Terminology  
In order to lay a foundation for our arguments against the statistical account, we review 
two useful distinctions that are commonly drawn in the recent literature on cp-laws. 
  Gerhard Schurz (2002) distinguishes exclusive and comparative cp-laws. Exclusive 
cp-laws state that systems display a certain behavior provided there are no disturbing fac-
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tors. The disturbing or interfering factors have to be absent for the behavior in question to 
be displayed. Newton’s first law may be an example of an exclusive cp-law, as it describes 
the behavior of a body in the absence of forces. Other cp-laws require that certain (some-
times unspecified) factors remain constant as opposed to being absent. An example is the 
following law: ‘if the supply of a commodity increases (decreases), the price decreases 
(increases)’. The law is a comparative cp-law because it requires that certain factors remain 
constant (e.g. demand). Cp-laws may be both exclusive and comparative, as, for instance, 
in the above example. It is not only required that the demand remains constant (which is 
often explicitly mentioned), it is furthermore tacitly assumed that there are no state inter-
ventions, natural catastrophes, wars etc. Strictly speaking, exclusive cp-laws can be recon-
structed as special cases of comparative cp-laws with the relevant variables set to the value 
0. However, exclusive cp-laws play a major role in the context of idealizations and special 
treatments of this case have been suggested. We follow the literature in distinguishing ex-
clusive from (other) comparative cp-laws.  
Earman and Roberts introduce a second helpful distinction (that is independent of 
the first distinction). The distinction of lazy and non-lazy cp-conditions.4 They argue that a 
cp-clause is dispensable if all exceptions to the law (and other conditions that have to ob-
tain in order for the generalization to be true) can be listed and it is merely a matter of con-
venience and the result of  “laziness” that the conditions are not listed explicitly. Earman 
and Roberts refer to such a finite list as a “lazy” cp-clause. According to Earman and Rob-
erts, only “non-lazy” cp-clauses are proper cp-clauses: a proper cp-clause is an open clause 
                                                
4 See also Earman, Roberts, and Smith (2002, 283f). Schurz uses the terminology of definite versus indefinite 
cp-conditions for the same distinction (Schurz 2002, section 3).   
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of which we do not know how to complete it. For what follows we will distinguish two 
senses of non-lazy, both of which can be found in Earman and Roberts (1999). 
  
i. Non-Lazy1: According to the first reading of non-laziness, the list of exceptions and 
conditions is open-ended and thus cannot be completed (Earman and Roberts 1999, 
439, 441, 444, 467). 
ii. Non-Lazy2: According to the second reading, disturbing factors that might need to be 
taken into account in order to complete the cp-clause are outside the conceptual and 
methodological resources of the special science in question and, thus, cannot be cap-
tured. (Earman and Roberts 1999, 462f). 
 
Cp-laws or cp-clauses that are non-lazy2 need not be non-lazy1. Even if the relevant condi-
tions cannot be stated in the vocabulary of the special science, there might be a finite list if 
we allow for further conceptual resources (of, for instance, the physical sciences). 
 
3. Lange’s Dilemma 
The problems concerning cp-laws are usually introduced by way of a dilemma, according 
to which law statements of the special sciences are either false empirical or trivially true 
statements. Many laws, such as Galileo’s law are false if the law is read as a strict (univer-
sal) generalization. The claim ‘whenever a body falls, it falls according to the equation: s = 
½ gt2’ is false, because in water and other media the equation does not correctly describe 
the behavior of the bodies in question. Similarly the claim ‘if the supply of a commodity 
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increases (decreases), the price decreases (increases)’ is false if read as a strict generaliza-
tion, because there may be state interventions and other factors which lead to counter-
instances to the strict generalization. This is the first horn of the dilemma (“falsity”).  
  If, on the other hand, the law is hedged by a cp-clause, then Galileo’s law becomes 
‘whenever a body falls (freely), it falls according to the equation: s = ½ gt2, unless some 
interfering factor intervenes’.  This claim appears to be trivially true, at least if the notion 
of an interfering factor is not further specified. If what is meant by an interfering factor is 
simply ‘a factor that makes the law turn out to be false’, the hedged claim says no more 
than ‘the relation s = ½ gt2 holds, unless it does not’. This is the second horn of the dilem-
ma (“trivialty”). In what follows, we will call this ‘Lange’s dilemma’ (named after Marc 
Lange 1993, 235). The dilemma poses a challenge for an account of truth-conditions of cp-
law statements. 
  
4. Statistical Accounts of special science laws 
Earman and Roberts are quite pessimistic with regard to spelling out the truth conditions of 
cp-laws. However, this is not a major problem, they argue, because fundamental laws are 
not in need of cp-clauses and special science generalizations should not be understood as 
cp-laws either. Rather cp-laws play the scientific role of gesturing towards underlying gen-
eralizations that are more precise and not in need of cp-clauses: 
 
[A] ‘ceteris paribus law’ is an element of a ‘work in progress’, an embryonic theory 
on its way to being developed to the point where it makes definite claims about the 
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world. It has been found that in a vaguely defined set of circumstances, a given 
generalizations has appeared to be mostly right or mostly reliable, and there is a 
hunch that somewhere in the neighborhood is a genuine, well-defined generaliza-
tion, for which the search is on. (Earman and Roberts 1999, 466; emphasis added)  
 
The essential point in this quote is that the preliminary formulation of a cp-law – that is 
“mostly right or mostly reliable” – belongs to the “context of discovery” of a search for a 
well-defined generalization. In the case of the special sciences, the result of the successful 
search for a well-defined generalization is a statistical generalization. By way of illustra-
tion Earman and Roberts refer to a case Kincaid discusses as an example of a statistical 
generalization: Jeffery Paiges’ study of revolutions in agrarian societies. Earman and Rob-
erts discuss one of Paiges’ empirical findings as an example of a special science generali-
zation: commercial hacienda systems tend to lead to agrarian revolt, whereas plantation 
systems tend to lead to labor reform (also mentioned in Roberts 2004, 165). Paiges argues 
for these claims on the basis of classifications (e.g. hacienda systems as opposed to other 
agrarian systems) and statistical analyses.  
The statistical account permits two readings. According to the first and more liberal 
reading, Earman and Roberts reconstruct Paiges’ statistical generalization as follows: ‘It is 
mostly true that commercial hacienda systems lead to agrarian revolt, whereas plantation 
systems lead to labor reform.’ This mostly-statement is true, if it is the case that a generali-
zations holds in the majority of intended applications, i.e. if it is the case that in the majori-
ty of agrarian systems the generalization ‘if it is a commercial hacienda, then …’ holds. It 
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is essential to this reading that a special science generalization is qualified by the operator 
‘it is mostly true. For this reason we will call this reading of the statistical account the 
‘mostly-reading’. It is worth stressing two points regarding this reading: firstly, a sentence 
of the form ‘it is mostly the case that p’ allows ‘p’ to be a deterministic as well as statisti-
cal a generalization. Secondly, Earman and Roberts claim that there is no need of a cp-
clause. The clause has been replaced by ‘it is mostly right’. The non-strict character of the 
generalization is derived from the fact that the generalization does not hold in all (but the 
majority of) intended applications.  
Elsewhere Earman and Roberts present their account of special science generaliza-
tions in slightly different words. Typical special science generalizations, they argue, are 
claims about “actual correlation among variables across various populations” (Earman and 
Roberts 1999, 467). These statements assert “a certain precisely defined statistical relation 
among well-defined variables” (Earman and Roberts 1999: 467, also Roberts 2004). That 
is, special science laws are statistical generalizations of the following form:  
 
In population H, a variable P is positively statistically correlated with variable S 
across all sub-populations that are homogeneous with respect to the variables V1, 
…, Vn (Earman and Roberts 1999: 467). 
 
This suggests that the above special science generalization should be reconstructed as fol-
lows: in all intended applications (i.e. all agrarian systems that are homogenous w.r.t. the 
values of the variables V1, …, Vn), there is a positive non-strict correlation between com-
  
8 
mercial hacienda systems and agrarian revolt, as well as between plantation systems and 
labor reform. This reading captures the non-strict character of special science generaliza-
tions by understanding these generalizations as statements about non-trivial conditional 
probabilities (i.e. conditional probabilities other than 0 and 1).5 Let us call this reading of 
the statistical account the ‘positive correlation-reading’. Again, Earman and Roberts claim 
that this reading of special science generalizations appears to dispense with cp-clauses. 
In sum, the essential difference between the two readings is that the mostly-reading 
of special science generalizations is compatible with these generalizations being determin-
istic and probabilistic, while the positive-correlation-reading requires understanding spe-
cial science generalizations as non-strict statistical generalizations. Both readings are in-
tended to capture the ‘non-strict’ character of special science laws without making use of a 
lazy cp-clause.   
  In the recent literature, at least one other version of the statistical account has been 
advocated by Gerhard Schurz.6 Schurz (2001, 2002) argues that special science laws ought 
to be understood as normic laws of the form ‘normally, As are Bs’. What matters most for 
our present purposes is that normic laws imply what Schurz calls the statistical conse-
quence thesis. The latter thesis consists in the assertion of “a high statistical probability of 
Ax conditional on Bx” (Schurz 2002, 365) or “numerically unspecified statistical generali-
                                                
5 Probabilities are interpreted as actual frequencies here, for a discussion of this point see Reutlinger (manu-
script).  
6 When characterizing dispositional terms, Rudolf Carnap already refers to an “escape clause” of the form 
“unless there are disturbing factors or provided the environment is in a normal state” and “usual circumstanc-
es in a laboratory” (Carnap 1956, 59). 
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zations of the form ‘Most As are Bs’” (Hüttemann, Reutlinger, Schurz 2011, section 8.1).7 
Schurz’s normic laws can be understood as an instance of the actual-correlation reading. 
Schurz’s as well as Earman and Roberts’ views have in common that they reconstruct spe-
cial science generalizations, which appear to be hedged by a lazy cp-clauses, as statistical 
generalizations. 
The statistical account of special science generalizations (both according to the 
mostly-reading and the positive-correlation reading) appears to be promising in at least 
three important respects: 
  
1. Prima facie, a non-lazy cp-clause is not needed.  
2. Statistical generalizations are indeed (dis)confirmable by evidence. 
3. Statistical generalizations stating correlations capture the non-strict, non-universal, 
and exception-ridden character of generalizations in the special sciences. 
 
If the statistical account could be defended for special science generalizations the pay-off 
would indeed be considerable. We will, however, argue that this account does not work. It 
may be adequate for some special science generalizations but not as a general account of 
special science generalizations. In what follows we present two arguments against the sta-
tistical account. The first argument is directed against the mostly-reading. The second ar-
gument is directed against both readings.  
                                                
7 Schurz (2001, 2002) provides an evolution-theoretic argument for the statistical consequence thesis. A 
discussion of this argument would exceed the length of this paper (cf. also Reutlinger, Hüttemann and Schurz 
2011: section 8.1). Instead we focus only on the conclusion (i.e. the normic account as a special case of the 
statistical account). 
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5. Objection I: Cartwright’s Dilemma  
In this section, we primarily address the mostly-reading.8 That is, we are interested in the 
claim that special science generalizations that appear to need a cp-clause, ought to be re-
constructed as asserting that the generalization in question holds mostly.  
  We will start with a problem that Nancy Cartwright posed. The point of presenting 
the problem is not that those generalizations that can in fact be reconstructed according to 
the mostly-reading fall under the problem. Rather, the problem highlights the fact that 
there are many special science generalizations that cannot be reconstructed according to 
this reading in the first place. In her How the Laws of Physics Lie, Cartwright presents an 
argument whose main target is the covering law model of scientific explanation. However, 
the force of the argument carries over to the statistical account. The gist of the argument 
can be stated as a dilemma for cp-laws:  
  
Ceteris paribus generalizations, read literally without the ‘ceteris paribus’ modifier, 
are false. […]. On the other hand, with the modifier the ceteris paribus generaliza-
tions may be true, but they cover only those few cases where the conditions are 
right. (Cartwright 1983, 45).  
 
The horns of this dilemma are falsity and restricted applicability. Newton’s first law is an 
example (again from physics – we will turn to examples from the special sciences shortly) 
which can be used to illustrate the dilemma:  
                                                
8 The argument also affects the positive-correlation-reading if the positive correlations in questions are high 
correlation and correlations are interpreted as actual frequencies. 
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Every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line, un-
less it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it. (Newton 1999, 
416) 
 
Without the qualification “unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed 
upon it” Newton’s first law is false. On the other hand, if the law is qualified by a cp-
clause, then it applies to very few cases (if any cases at all). Call this dilemma: Cart-
wright’s dilemma. It is worth noting that Cartwright’s dilemma differs from Lange’s di-
lemma, as the horns of the latter are falsity and triviality (see Section 3). Unlike in the case 
of Lange’s dilemma, Cartwright’s point is not that cp-laws might be trivially true but rather 
that it is difficult to see why we should care about them if they cover only rarely occurring 
situations.  
The dilemma is not a dilemma for those special science generalizations that might 
be adequately reconstructed according to the mostly-reading (we have not argued that there 
aren’t any). The important point of the dilemma is that the mostly-reading cannot be a gen-
eral account of special science laws. The dilemma highlights the fact that there are many 
generalizations, which appear to need a cp-clause (whether special science or not), because 
the generalizations cover only rare cases and can thus not be reconstructed as applying to 
most cases.9 The important point for the goal of our paper is thus one of the premises of 
                                                
9 We are not going to discuss a solution that succeeds in avoiding Cartwright’s dilemma in this paper. See 
Hüttemann (1998) and (2012) for an attempted solution of this problem. 
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Cartwright’s argument: There are many cp-laws (both in physics and in the special scienc-
es) covering only very special rarely occurring situations.  
  Examples of generalizations in the special sciences that cover only rare cases are 
not far to seek. Consider two cases from economics: as we have stated before, economic 
agents maximize their expected utility. Rational agents are assumed to have complete in-
formation, transitive preferences etc. These features of agents are usually taken to be ideal-
ized because no real world agent has complete information. The law of demand holds un-
der the condition of perfect competition. Perfect competition involves, among other things, 
perfectly informed agents that are competing and zero transaction costs. Idealized anteced-
ent conditions or idealized conditions of application (such as ‘if the population size is infi-
nite …’, ‘if mating occurs randomly …’) are also frequent in the case of generalizations in 
population ecology and evolutionary biology (Godfrey-Smith 2009, French 2011, Rice 
2012). In analogy with Newton’s first law and Snell’s law, these examples suggest that 
laws in general should not be read as asserting that the relevant conditions of application 
obtain frequently. Cartwright’s dilemma also applies to the examples from the special sci-
ences: on the one hand, if we understand, say, the law of demand as a claim about what 
mostly happens, then the law would most certainly turn out to be false. On the other hand, 
if one qualifies the law by an exclusive cp-clause, then it does not apply to most real world 
cases. 
  It is worth pointing out that the problem of ‘falsity and restricted applicability’ is 
not genuine to exclusive cp-conditions. The problem might very well arise in the case of 
comparative cp-laws such as ‘if the supply of a commodity increases (decreases), the price 
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decreases (increases)’. As we have seen this statement is a comparative cp-law because 
(among other things) it requires that certain factors remain constant (e.g. demand). Should 
we read this cp-law as asserting that (among other things) the constancy of demand is a 
condition that obtains frequently, i.e. in most markets? It is unlikely – this assumption 
would presumably turn the law into a straightforward falsehood. 
  The conclusion we want to draw is that it is inadequate to reconstruct laws of the 
special sciences as claims about what mostly happens. While it may be true in some cases 
that a (deterministic or probabilistic) law statement holds in most intended applications, 
this cannot be a necessary condition for their truth or for their respectability. 
  One additional remark: we have objected to replacing cp-clauses by phrases such as 
“it is mostly true”. However, the core of our objection is not concerned with the vagueness 
of “mostly”. More importantly, we worry that very often whether or not a generalization is 
accepted as a cp-law does not at all depend on the frequency with which the relevant con-
ditions are actualized. It is not in general part of the content of a special science law or 
generalization to state how often (whether characterized vaguely or quantitatively precise) 
its antecedent conditions are fulfilled (for a similar observation see Hempel 1988, section 
5). 
 
6. Objection II: Lange’s dilemma and non-lazy cp-conditions  
Our second objection applies to the positive-correlation-reading and – a fortiori – to the 
mostly-reading too. According to the positive-correlation-reading, the statistical character 
of a special science generalization accounts for the exceptions – that is, a generalization 
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has exceptions in the sense that it is a claim about non-trivial conditional probabilities. The 
following might be an illustration: in all agrarian societies a certain non-strict correlation 
(e.g. between a certain kinds of farming and kinds of political activities) holds – provided a 
certain finite number of conditions10 obtains (stated as the claim that the variables V1, …, 
Vn takes particular values). According to Earman and Roberts, one does not need a cp-
clause because a non-strict correlation naturally allows for exceptions. However, it is diffi-
cult to see how this move could provide a solution to the problem of interpreting special 
science generalizations. In the remainder of this section, we provide an objection to the 
positive-correlation reading. This is our second objection to the statistical account of spe-
cial science generalizations.   
  Our objection consists in the worry that the statistical account does not get rid of 
non-lazy cp-conditions. If this worry is justified, then the statistical account does not live 
up to Earman and Roberts’s original aspirations of providing an account of special science 
laws that does not rely on non-lazy cp-conditions (see end of Section 4). The question we 
want to press is whether Earman and Roberts are justified to claim that the conditions can 
be considered to be lazy cp-conditions. To be precise, conditions are stated in terms of the 
variables in {V1, …, Vn} taking a certain (range of) value(s). As mentioned in Section 2, 
cp-conditions are lazy if the list of conditions is either finite (‘lazy1’) or finite and entirely 
in the scope of a special science (‘lazy2’). It is a striking fact that Earman and Roberts do 
not present an argument for the claim for the claim that the list of variables V1, …, Vn and, 
thus, the corresponding list of conditions is finite (which is tantamount to the claim that the 
                                                
10 Conditions such as the “proximity of progressive urban political parties” (Earman and Roberts 1999, 468). 
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cp-conditions are lazy cp-conditions). We think they need an argument.  
  How do non-lazy cp-conditions enter the statistical account? Recall that Earman 
and Roberts refer to statistical generalizations that include other variables than the anteced-
ent P: “in population H, a variable P is positively statistically correlated with variable S 
across all sub-populations that are homogeneous with respect to the variables V1, …, Vn” 
(Earman & Roberts 1999, 467, emphasis added). One way to describe the complex ante-
cedent of this generalization is to say that even probabilistic generalizations are qualified 
by a comparative cp-clause (Schurz 2002, Reutlinger, Hüttemann and Schurz 2011: section 
3.1). The comparative reading of the cp-clause specifies that, for instance, P and S are cor-
related if other variables V1, …, Vn take specific values. The comparative reading corre-
sponds to the literal translation of ceteris paribus, i.e. other things being equal.   
So, given the comparative reading of cp-conditions, how does a non-lazy cp-clause 
enter the statistical account of special science laws? It is very plausible that the Vi of an 
economic or ecological statistical generalizations include physical and biological condi-
tions that are not in the conceptual and methodological scope of the discipline in question. 
Consider two examples. First, rational agents are thought of as maximizing their utilities if 
they are not drugged. The condition of not being drugged might be part of the implicit 
knowledge of economist, but this condition is outside of the scope of standard micro-
economics.11  
 Secondly, consider another illustration by Marc Lange. The area law of island-
biogeography states:  
                                                
11 Similarly, Lange (2002) speaks of “off stage” variables, and Strevens (2008) refers to opaque conditions of 
application. 
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the equilibrium number S of a species of a given taxonomic group on an island (as 
far as creatures are concerned) increases [polynomially] with the islands area [A]: S 
= c×Az. The (positive-valued) constants c and z are specific to the taxonomic group 
and island group. (Lange 2002, 416f.) 
   
Suppose we interpret the area law as a statistical generalization, as the statistical account 
requires. As Lange observes, the truth of the area law – even on a statistical reading – part-
ly depends on conditions that lie outside of the scope of interest of island bio-geographers. 
 
There are counterfactual suppositions under which the fundamental laws of physics 
would still have held, but under which the ‘area law’ is not preserved. For example, 
had Earth lacked a magnetic field, then cosmic rays would have bombarded all lati-
tudes, which might well have prevented life from arising, in which case [equilibri-
um number of a species] S would have been zero irrespective of [the island’s area] 
A. (Lange 2002, 417) 
 
Lange says that the truth of area law depends, among other things, on the actual strength of 
the magnetic field of the Earth. The law statement would be false if the magnetic field 
would be different than it actually is. Lange continues:   
 
The area law is not prevented from qualifying as an island-bio-geographical law 
[…] by its failure to be preserved under [this] […] counterfactual supposition […]. 
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The supposition concerning Earth’s magnetic field falls outside of island biogeog-
raphy’s range of interest. It twiddles with a parameter that island biogeography 
takes no notice of, or at least does not take it as a variable. (Lange 2002, 418) 
 
In other words, the condition that the magnetic field of the Earth has its actual strength is a 
relevant condition, i.e. whether it obtains makes a difference to the truth or falsity of the 
area law. However, this condition is not salient in context of island biogeography. 
  What precisely do these examples show? First, they show that we have a good rea-
son to speak of a non-lazy2 cp-conditions that are relevant for statistical generalizations: 
that is, these conditions are not in the conceptual and methodological scope of the disci-
pline in question and can thus not be captured by a statistical generalization formulated in 
the terminology of the special science in question. Thus, understanding special science 
laws as probabilistic generalizations does at least not replace non-lazy2 cp-conditions.12 
However, even if these conditions are non-lazy2 they need not be non-lazy1. That is, even if 
the conditions cannot be stated in the vocabulary of the special science, there might be a 
finite list, if one allows for further conceptual and methodological resources (of other sci-
ences). However, Earman and Roberts provide no argument for the claim that a finite list 
of such conditions will be available. Nor is there an argument for the claim that a finite list 
of conditions that fall inside the scope of the relevant special science can be given.  
  Secondly, if statistical special science laws have either (i) non-lazy2-conditions that 
are at the same time non-lazy1 (i.e. no finite list of them can be provided), or (ii) there are 
                                                
12 Ironically for Earman and Roberts, Hempel (1988, 152f) argues for this point against Carnap. 
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additional non-lazy1 cp-conditions that fall inside the scope of the special science in ques-
tion (if such a case is conceivable), then, we argue, the statistical approach cannot avoid 
Lange’s dilemma. Suppose there is a non-lazy condition C for a higher-level statistical law 
‘p(B|A & V1, …, Vn)=x’, as sketched in the two examples above. On the one hand, if C is 
not added to the antecedent of the statistical law, then the statistical law is false. This is the 
first horn (falsity) of Lange’s dilemma. On the other hand, if C is an open-ended list (non-
lazy1), then ‘p(B|A & V1, …, Vn & C)=x’ becomes a statement without any clear meaning. 
According to Earman and Roberts’ own reasoning, a law statement including an open-
ended list of conditions C is in danger of becoming a trivial truth such as ‘most As are Bs, 
unless something interferes’ or ‘A and B are correlated in conditions V1, …, Vn, unless 
something interferes’.  
  To sum up the result of our second objection, the statistical account does not suc-
ceed in solving a problem it was designed for: it fails to dispense with non-lazy cp-
conditions.     
  We will conclude this section by discussing a possible objection to our argument. 
One might object that the statistical account captures nicely that – and even explains why – 
there are exceptions to a nomic relation. According to the statistical account, a higher-level 
statistical law simply describes a frequency that is the result of lazy and non-lazy interfer-
ers. One kind of referring to these interfering factors is to speak of ‘noise’ coming from the 
environment of the system under description.  
  We respond to this objection that it is true that in some cases these frequencies ob-
tain and they can be explained by (environmental or lower-level) interfering factors (cf. 
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Strevens 2008, chapter 10, for an elaborate account of explaining frequencies in this way). 
However, as we have argued in section 5, in the case of many laws there is not a good rea-
son to believe that there are many of the frequencies required by the statistical account. 
Even if we focus on cases in which the relevant frequencies exist and in which the fre-
quencies are the result of lower-level interfering or enabling factors, we would like to insist 
that the description of these lower-level factors is at least non-lazy2 exercise. However, this 
is just what Earman and Roberts seem to deny. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Earman and Roberts advocate the statistical account of special science laws. At first 
glance, their account has the advantage of capturing the non-strict character of special sci-
ence generalizations without being committed to allegedly problematic cp-conditions. We 
have presented two objections to the statistical account. The first objection attempts to es-
tablish the view that – contrary to the mostly-reading of the statistical account – it is not 
correct to say that special science generalizations should be interpreted as statements about 
what happens in most intended applications of the law. According to our second objection, 
the statistical account does not get rid of non-lazy cp-conditions. Hence, we conclude that 
the statistical account does not qualify as a general account of special science laws.   
 We will conclude with a brief outlook. If our arguments are sound, then statistical ac-
count does not succeed in dispensing with cp-conditions. This result motivates the follow-
ing question: what is the positive account of lazy cp-conditions? Insofar as the authors are 
concerned, Hüttemann argues for a dispositionalist account of exclusive cp-laws. Accord-
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ing to the dispositionalist ‘cp, all As are Bs’ is true if all As have the disposition to B. In his 
(2012) Hüttemann argues that the two main objections against such an account can be 
countered, provided there exist laws of composition that describe how different disposi-
tions contribute to one phenomenon. On this basis, he argues, it is (1) possible to account 
for the fact that referring to a disposition, which is not completely manifest, might never-
theless contribute to an explanation of an actual phenomenon. Furthermore (2), the laws of 
composition help to explain how we might gain evidence for how a system would behave 
in the absence of disturbing factors even if actual disturbing factors are present. The con-
tribution of the disturbing factors can be calculated and – on the basis of the laws of com-
position – it can be ‘subtracted’. This shows that at least some exclusive cp-laws are empir-
ically testable. Reutlinger (2011) advocates an updated version of a completer account. 
This approach accounts for the truth conditions of a cp-generalization by relying on two 
essential concepts: (a) the concept of minimal invariance captures a relevance relation be-
tween the variables explicitly figuring in the generalization, and (b) the notion of a quasi-
Newtonian law is used to describe the influence of disturbing factors.  
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